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In an essay that was part of a string of works aimed at unravelling the meaning of ‘Europe’, 
J.G.A. Pocock emphasised the indeterminacy of its identity as a constituent element of any 
discourse about Europe. Its resistance and resilience against all attempts to fix its boundaries 
and to define its past would be the main component of Europe’s (self)representations. Viewed 
from such an angle, European identity might be, at best, the recognition of a plurality of 
different cultural values and social and political practices that cannot be subsumed under a 
unifying and unified narrative. If anything, Pocock suggested, it is the history of such an 
indeterminacy, so often overlooked or ignored, that ought to be told.1 Similar doubts are shared 
by many others. As Richard Evans has recalled, A.J.P. Taylor once went as far as to assert that 
‘European history is whatever the historian wants it to be’. It was, as he saw it, but a chaotic 
collection of ideas and events taking place in or tightly connected to ‘the area we call Europe’. 
However, he also had to admit that he was not sure what such an area was and that, therefore, 
he was ‘pretty well in a haze about the rest!’2 According to Evans, Taylor might have been 
right – though he then added, importantly, that what historians wanted constantly changed.3 
But Evans’s remark hints at the crux of the matter. In fact, it questions the interests of historians, 
their duties, and the relationship they entertain with ‘their’ pasts. Importantly, the urge to 
overcome the historical boundaries of national pasts, so tightly connect to the desire to find a 
common European past, has emerged time and again when nationalism has shown its darkest 
side or when the political limits of the nation-state have become manifest. At such historical 
junctures, in times of crisis, many scholars have turned to Europe. As has been noted, the fact 
that between the 1920s and the 1950s attempts to find a single, common European history 
multiplied is telling.4 Henri Pirenne’s Histoire de l’Europe, written during the First World War 
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in a German prison camp and then published in 1936, Louis Halphen’s L’essor de l’Europe 
(1932), seeking a common medievalist Europe against the Muslim danger, and Benedetto 
Croce’s Storia d’Europa nel secolo decimonono (1932), celebrating European history as a 
relentless march towards freedom, are all important examples. To these, one need only add the 
works of Guido De Ruggiero, Christopher Dawson, H.L.A. Fisher, John Bowle, Heinz 
Gollwitzer, Oskar Halecki, Denis Hay, or Carlo Curcio.5 Even Lucien Febvre and Federico 
Chabod’s lessons on the history of the idea of Europe and on the history of European 
civilization in Nazi-occupied Paris and Milan, later to become iconic books on the subject, are 
revealing of a deeply felt urge to find a new way of thinking the past and overcoming the 
narrow boundaries of the nation.6 As Dawson wrote in 1932: ‘We must rewrite our history 
from the European point of view and take as much trouble to understand the unity of our 
common civilization as we have given hitherto to studying our national individuality’.7 On his 
part, in 1944 Croce spoke of the need to ‘de-nationalize history’ so that historians might ‘help 
to cure this dejected and intoxicated world’.8 As recent historians have pointed out, although 
in a very different political and social setting, globalization has posed the need to overcome the 
sin of ‘methodological nationalism’ in the study of the past, inspiring various transnational or 
global turns.9 At the same time, the growing political and economic integration of Europe and 
the search for its legitimacy have renewed the urge to have a better understanding of its past. 
Some scholars have gone as far as to claim that just as nineteenth-century historians helped 
shape the ideological arsenal for building the nation, so they should now ‘contribute towards 
supporting the European integration process by providing accompanying arguments’.10 Others 
have adopted a more nuanced stand, insisting on the need for ‘building coherence and 
determining relations between stories made by Europeans, with which Europeans can identify 
and on the basis of which Europeans can be distinguished from non-Europeans’.11 The complex 
relationship between political motivation and the scholarly responsibility of the historian 
emerges here in all clarity. 
Any scepticism towards the very notion of a European history or narratives is, of course, 
justified. That the history of Europe is as much about violence and divisions – including 
religious wars, national clashes, and ideological conflicts – as it is about shared cultural, social, 
and economic accomplishments is undeniable. For some, the former even overshadow the 
latter. It is a point that might easily be grasped when considering the most divisive of human 
activities, so central to so much scholarship, that is, war. Writing shortly before the outbreak 
of the First World War, the great French philosopher Georges Sorel noted that Europe, a space 
inhabited by a number of different peoples with conflicting interests, desires, and ways of life, 
had always been the place of ‘warlike cataclysms’ and that the ‘people of Europe can be united 
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only by a single idea: to wage war to one another’.12 There is certainly some truth in this. 
Recently, scholars have even argued that the one common element that might weave together 
so many national histories into a single fabric is precisely war. Already experienced by 
scholars, artists, scientists, traders, and wealthy or aristocratic travellers, Europe became 
something very real for thousands and even millions of the lower and middle classes only in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, fighting on the battlefields scattered 
throughout the Old Continent.13 In the process, invading armies carried with them ideas, values, 
and ways of life that helped to create shared forms of a European existence. However, if war 
has been such a constant presence in the history unfolding on the continent, turning it into an 
immense land of death and destruction, the incessant efforts of countless politicians, diplomats, 
and intellectuals to limit its destructiveness is also an undeniable fact. It was such efforts that 
eventually led to the birth of the Jus ad bellum and, ultimately, laid down the foundations of 
modern international law. From such a viewpoint, one might even find another definition of 
what European history might be. According to Michael Geyer, in fact, if war ‘structured a 
common “European space”, the containment of “savage” violence and the art of peacemaking 
“constituted” Europe in thought and practice’.14 It is an argument partly reminiscent of the 
ideas set forth by Carl Schmitt in his famous Der Nomos der Erde (1950). In the view of the 
German political and legal theorist, the emergence of the Jus Publicum Europaeum in the early 
modern period shaped a space in which violence among states was contained and limited 
through the recognition of the justus hostis – the legitimate enemy. He saw this as a crucial 
distancing from previous images of the enemy, usually inspired by religion, as the embodiment 
of all evil. However, this also produced at once a space, outside of Europe, with no laws or 
rules; a space waiting to be conquered and exploited by the peoples of Europe; a space where 
the most atrocious violence against the unfaithful, the uncivilized, the barbarian was deemed 
legitimate.15 The history of Europe might then be seen as a process leading to the containment 
of an ever-expanding destructive capacity within the Old Continent – in truth, between 1648 
and 1914 a rather successful attempt – and to the violent domination by its peoples of the rest 
of the globe. So, when considering its history through the prism of conflict, Europe might be 
seen a space unified by perpetual war as well as a space where incessant efforts are made to 
limit its destructive violence. In effect, the narratives built on these two contrasting views are 
both as interesting as plausible. But they are only two among innumerable other possible and 
equally plausible – perhaps even compelling – narratives. In fact, one might decide to read 
Europe’s history through the lenses of the idea of freedom, making the contention that Europe 
has been the space where political and then economic and social rights have gradually extended 
to most of its citizens – in spite of the many setbacks. But it might also be argued, with equal 
strength, that Europe, Mark Mazower’s Dark Continent, has been the place where freedom has 
turned into its opposite. Instead, were one to consider the progress of reason, Europe would 
then become the space of a constant struggle against superstition, myth and, for some, religion. 
But it could also turn into the place of an increasing distancing between substantive and 
instrumental reason leading to the Holocaust – From Athens to Auschwitz, to use the title of 
Christian Meier’s book.16 Clearly, there are countless possible European narratives, and 
historians have here a greater discretion over their object of enquiry than when studying the 
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nation. Inevitably, Taylor’s comments about the malleability of European history come back 
to mind. 
It is a point worth noting that many of the attempts made by the advocates of a European 
narrative are somehow based on the assumption that the model that ought to be followed is that 
of the nation. Just as nineteenth-century historians used their skills to help foster – more or less 
deliberately – a feeling of nationhood, it is believed, so should today’s scholars encourage a 
shared feeling of Europeanness. Leaving aside the many issues that a post-modernist approach 
to the past would raise as well as the clear political implications, it can easily be argued that 
such an assumption is misleading for at least two reasons. First, national narratives are always 
sacred – or, rather, sacralised – stories. As Alberto Mario Banti has argued, references to 
sacrifice and martyrdom are always central to, or even the backbone of, any national 
discourse.17 The feeling of indebtedness towards those who have given their lives for their 
community is what actually creates a bond between the dead and the recipients of the narrative, 
thus shaping an imagined community – or, actually, a real communion – between them. Of 
course, the case of European narratives is very different – sacred nation / profane Europe might 
be a quite an apt way of putting it – and such difference might explain, in part, the difficulty of 
recipients identifying with any European narrative and, importantly for us, shows the need to 
write Europe’s history in a much different way. The second, equally important reason is related 
to the difficulty of finding a European collective will. It is a point related to that of sovereignty 
and its meaning in the shaping of historical narratives. In fact, in classical political thought, a 
nation’s will is expressed through the decision of its sovereign and, still in the seventeenth 
century, it would have been enough to dissect the king’s will to grasp the nation’s history. This 
way of interpreting the past contributed – and still contributes – to a misleading reification of 
the nation, making of it a coherent, collective actor with a clearly discernible will whose actions 
and deeds one might follow throughout the centuries. Because of the decision of its sovereign, 
in fact, divisions and the many wills of individuals and groups that actually make up a nation 
are conveniently – from the historian’s point of view – relegated to a secondary plane. Class, 
regional, gender, or generational differences are ignored in the face of a clear political decision 
with clear political consequences. In this respect, since Europe lacks a will of its own – or, 
rather, lacks the medium through which this might be imagined – it is impossible to see it as 
an actor whose deeds and volitions can be traced throughout the centuries. And this makes it 
impossible to write European history following the model of the nation. Of course, the fact that 
in the history of political thought nation and sovereignty have almost always been conceived 
of as inseparable notions, further problematises the whole issue.  
In spite of the political, social, and religious differences separating the peoples of Europe 
from one another, it is commonly assumed – almost intuitively – that there is a series of shared 
cultural practices that have real effects and consequences on their lives. The idea that, 
notwithstanding its political fragmentation, there was such a thing as a European community, 
something essentially different from Christianitas even if somehow rooted in it, dates back to 
the fifteenth century. Machiavelli and Botero and then Bayle, Leibniz, Montesquieu, Voltaire, 
Robertson, Gibbon, Novalis, to name but a few, all spoke of the values, manners, and customs 
shared by the different peoples of Europe and which defined a unique civilisation. It was for 
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this common way of life, noted Edmund Burke in 1796, that ‘no citizen of Europe could be 
altogether an exile in any part of it’.18 The great French historian François Guizot, in his 1828 
Histoire générale de la civilization en Europe, was adamant: ‘I say European civilization, 
because there is evidently so striking a uniformity in the civilization of the different states of 
Europe, as fully to warrant this appellation’.19 While Guizot’s words might be perplexing – as 
if they were meant to convince the reader rather than state an obvious fact –his view had 
become a truism for many observers by the beginning of the twentieth century. Not even the 
Great War could disprove it – and, for some, it actually confirmed its existence. In 1915, for 
instance, the French novelist Jules Romains took on the curious view that the conflict tearing 
Europe apart was but ‘an armed conflict within a homogeneous civilisation’. He was convinced 
that the causes of its virulence lay in the fact that fighting one another were peoples that held 
much in common. A war ‘between two peoples truly strangers to one another is colder, more 
impersonal, and its violence maintains the form of the political endeavour’, he observed.20 
However, while the existence of a common European civilization was widely accepted in the 
interwar years, Valéry, Husserl, Patoĉka, T.S. Eliot, and several others were still facing the 
conundrum of what were those shared values and practices that defined European civilisation 
and, equally important, where their origins ought to be sought. 
One way in which some historians sought the unity of European civilisation was by 
stressing the diversity of its national cultures. In fact, according to Guizot the most remarkable 
difference between Europe and other civilisations was ‘the unity of character’ that reigned in 
the latter. Each one of the non-European worlds, he wrote, ‘appears as though it had emanated 
from a single fact, from a single idea’ that entirely shaped its existence and institutions.21 
Whenever new forces or principles emerged, this usually led to a new single idea or class 
dominating the whole of society. Coexistence of and struggle between conflicting principles 
‘was no more than a passing, an accidental circumstance’.22 The condition of modern Europe 
was completely different, its history striking Guizot as ‘diversified, confused, and stormy’.23 
Different principles of social and political organization were engaged in a continual struggle 
that never led to one definitively overpowering the others. In his opinion, this variety of forces 
had been the precondition for a boundless progress that had endured fifteen centuries and which 
had grown increasingly faster because a ‘greater freedom attends upon all its movements’. The 
history of Europe was then the outcome of the struggle between the various factions and classes 
making up its nations, a struggle that ‘instead of rendering society stationary, has been a 
principal cause of its progress’.24 Guizot was adamant that this sort of ‘stabilized conflict’ a 
unification of Europe leading to political and cultural uniformity, inevitably stifling freedom, 
was simply impossible.25 In effect, Guizot’s liberal vision of European history, structured 
around a ‘difference in unity’ – a highly ambiguous and often misused idea – had illustrious 
predecessors. Already in the fifteenth century Machiavelli argued that the continuous and 
relentless struggle among its classes, republics, and states was the true source of European 
freedom, a condition that contrasted starkly with the immobility and despotism of the great 
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empires of the east. Montesquieu, in part, repeated the same ideas in the eighteenth century. Of 
course, such views and the related notion of Oriental despotism as the counterpart to European 
freedom are debatable at best. But what is interesting, within this liberal discourse, is the 
importance of the idea of progress in defining European identity on the one hand and, on the 
other, the role of Europe in world history. In fact, if Europe was seen simply as one civilisation 
among many, it also embodied the idea of civilisation as such.26 If civilisations were gradually 
proceeding towards a single, ‘common destiny’, Europe was at the forefront and stood as the 
model for all other ones.27 Seen from such a perspective, differences and boundaries could be 
established and explained by the different stages attained by civilisations on a path that was 
common to all. This meant, on the one hand, the existence of an underlying unity of all 
civilisations and, on the other, the possibility of some form of judgement over the degree of 
development attained. It meant, in other terms, that civilisation was at once a historical fact and 
the benchmark for an appraisal that was, inevitably, also moral and which, of course, was 
entirely determined by the achievements of the European man.  
This narrative, bringing together – or, actually, conflating – European and world history, 
was rooted in eighteenth-century philosophy and historical thought. The complex set of 
intellectual and cultural practices through which Europeans defined themselves against an 
imagined other are inseparable not only from a specific version of history but also from the 
shaping of a specific regime of historicity.28 In fact, a crucial aspect of how Europeans defined 
themselves in the early modern and modern periods relates to the ways in which they imagined 
the relationship between past, present, and future as such. Arguably, from the late seventeenth 
century onwards, discourses about Europe increasingly developed in connection with evolving 
notions of progress and were often couched in opposition to an alleged immobility of Europe’s 
Other. From Campanella to Fontenelle, Condorcet, Hegel, Marx, and Husserl, Europe was the 
paradigmatic locus of modernity.29 This was partly a product of the great age of discoveries, 
when the people of Europe came in touch with new cultures and civilizations. In particular, the 
image of the savage – whether real or imagined or distorted – so captivating for so many 
scholars, had a crucial impact on the development of European thought.30 In a state of nature, 
outside or at the beginning of historical time, the savage became central to the moral and 
political philosophy of the time as well as its historical thought. Partly because of the image of 
the savage on the one hand, and partly because of the assumed immobility of the ‘east’ on the 
other, Europe came increasingly to be seen as the place of an acceleration of time, a place of 
an increasing separation of natural and historical time – and, of course, of a growing power 
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over nature and the world.31 The underlying othering practice was accompanied by a 
unification – and Europeanization – of world history, one centred around the idea that to 
evangelize first, then to civilise and, finally, to modernize the rest of the world was the mission 
of Europe’s states and their peoples. 
Perhaps even more remarkable is the fact that such a Eurocentric vision of world history, 
first emerging in connection with the global political and economic expansion of the peoples 
of Europe, somehow survived and took on a new shape in times of crisis. In the aftermath of 
the First World War, a new shared feeling of Europeanness started to emerge, partly as a 
reaction to the military and ideological threat posed by the Soviet Union and the cultural and 
economic menace represented by the United States. As Count Hermann Keyserling noted in 
1928: ‘Europe emerges because non-Europeans are gaining more and more power. In this 
regard, what is common to all Europeans becomes more important than what divides us’.32 
Almost inevitably, the ‘dwarfing of Europe’ – to use Arnold Toynbee’s famous expression – 
prompted many scholars to seek a common European past.33 Moreover, by the 1920s and 1930s 
many also came to believe that the history of the world could no longer be equated with the 
history of Europe. In fact, this had been an assumption shared by many scholars at least since 
the publication of the abbé Raynal’s monumental Histoire philosophique et politique des 
établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes (1770), and surely one that 
animated much historical writing in the nineteenth century.34 Important steps in redefining the 
relationship between world history and European history included H.G. Wells’s The Outline of 
History (1918), Oswald Spengler’s Der Untergang des Abendlandes (1918–1923), and 
Toynbee’s A Study of History (1934–1954), in which were told the stories of the struggles 
between, and the rise and fall of, different civilizations over a unified globe. However, even in 
such works Europe still played a central role. There were two important reasons for this. The 
first was that because of Europe’s global domination during the two previous centuries, the 
world had attained a level of political, economic and cultural unification hitherto unknown. 
The second reason, according to some scholars, was that having civilized the world, Europe’s 
mission had come to an end and while this made its decline inevitable, it also meant that the 
values and ideas shaped by European history were now shared across the globe. It was against 
this background that the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset interpreted the rise of the USA 
and the USSR as the surge of two forces stemming from Europe. In his opinion, American 
hyper-capitalism and shallow consumerism as well as Soviet illiberal, barbarous Bolshevism 
were simply aberrations of values and ideas that had originally been European. However, 
severed from their origin, they had ‘lost their meaning’ and were now heralded by civilizations 
threatening everything that Europe stood for. Many others held similar views, including the 
French writer Paul Valéry. In his famous ‘La crise de l’esprit’, written in the immediate 
aftermath of the First World War, he claimed that ‘everything has come to Europe and 
everything has come from Europe. At least, almost everything’.35 According to the English 
historian H.A.L. Fisher, the peoples of Europe should ‘recall before it is too late that they are 
trustees for the civilization of the world. […] The common heritage of European civilization is 
the most splendid possession of man.’36 In 1909, the Anglo-French writer and historian, Hilaire 
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Belloc, had gone even further, stating that Europe ‘carries the fate of the whole world, lives by 
a life which is in contrast to that of every other region, because that life, though intense, is 
inexhaustible. There is present, therefore, in her united history, a dual function of maintenance 
and of change such as can be discovered neither in any one of her component parts nor in 
civilisations exterior to her own’. As he saw it, throughout its history, Europe had constantly 
sought a moral unity with the rest of the world.37 Indeed, many historians and scholars writing 
in the 1920s and 1930s would have thought of Europe simply as one among many civilizations; 
and yet, because of its unique past, they also believed that it alone enshrined truly universal 
values. 
It was in line with such ideas that many intellectuals maintained that all non-European 
civilizations lacked a past of their own. The ancient history of Eastern civilizations was 
certainly glorious but, having failed to create their own path to modernity, these had 
succumbed, politically or culturally, to the Europeans. As for the west, this was essentially an 
extension of Europe. In 1930, pondering over the history of Europe and the history of the world, 
Ortega y Gasset concluded that neither ‘New York nor Moscow’ could lead the world since 
they both lacked a real past.38 But some authors took the argument one step further, claiming 
that a crucial element that defined European civilisation was its willingness to scrutinize and 
dissect the past in an objective manner – another characteristic that allegedly set Europe apart 
from other civilizations. The philosopher Karl Jaspers linked the ‘historical feeling’ of the 
peoples of Europe to their unique idea of freedom: ‘For freedom to be, it is necessary that we 
plunge ourselves into history […]. The tireless realization of what is real and of what is 
possible, the intensification of historical consciousness, constitutes, with history itself, a 
fundamental trait of our European mind’.39 Benedetto Croce went even further. In 1930, he 
claimed that the rise of Italian Fascism was the clear manifestation that the relationship between 
historical thought and politics had lost all significance. He contended that the nation, a 
historical construction, had been vested with the aura of a natural fact. The nation was now 
obsolete; from an agent of liberation it had turned into a force of conservation, portraying itself 
as the eternal and natural subject of history. This was a consequence and a cause of the stifling 
of the feeling of historicity (sentimento storico) that made it impossible to understand the past 
in a critical and detached way. According to Croce, making the nation the beginning and end 
of history meant rejecting the possibility of alternative political and social formations. It was 
the end of all struggle and debate – which, like other liberal thinkers, he saw as the hallmark 
of Europe. Consistently, he saw such critical attitude towards the past as inherently European; 
as an element that radically separated Europe from its Other. Crucially, the Neapolitan 
philosopher believed that only through this incessant and critical rereading of the past could 
the proper understanding of universal morality emerge. And since the ‘sense of historicity 
coincides with the European feeling’, then Croce interpreted the rise of Fascism, the cult of a 
nation not withheld from the scrutiny of the historian, and the rejection of all political 
alternatives – i.e. the acceptance of immobility and the end of freedom – as the rise of what he 
called Anti-Europe.40Croce’s views are interesting in many ways. Importantly, they draw 
attention to the moral lessons of the past and how these might relate to certain political projects. 
It is a point particularly relevant when considering the relationship between Europe and its 
nations. In effect, Croce did not deny the historical importance of the nation – quite the 
opposite. As a historical construction, the product of the will of men manifesting itself over the 
centuries, it had been an instrument of liberation, a way of overcoming the empty and abstract 
cosmopolitanism of eighteenth-century thinkers – or so he argued. But Croce was also adamant 
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that, by the 1920s, the nation had become obsolete and that the deleterious consequences of its 
resilience were evident. In many respects, such arguments are still relevant today and, crucially 
for us, might indicate a possible way of considering Europe’s history/ies.  
Historical narratives provide meaning and significance to (selected) past events and 
developments. They influence social reality and collective memory, and thus play a major role 
in identity formation. Beyond their unifying function, especially in times of crisis, they can 
also enhance (or indeed undermine) the acceptability to certain ideas, personalities, and 
organisations. They are shaped by historians and intellectuals, but are also affected by other 
groups and individuals, including state officials and institutions, not least to further a particular 
political agenda.41 Narratives and interpretations of European history have taken on a particular 
political relevance in the context of European integration, often legitimizing the deepening and 
widening of the European Union and its predecessors since the 1950s against the diversity and 
resilience of national interests.42 European political developments, especially in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, are commonly described as a dark age of nationalist hatred and 
violence, culminating in two world wars and the Holocaust. As the European Council put it in 
the Laeken Declaration of December 2001, ‘for centuries, peoples and states have taken up 
arms and waged war to win control of the European continent’. The declaration, which 
launched a fundamental restructuring of the European Union, leading to the Treaty of Lisbon 
in 2007, consequently portrayed the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 
1951/1952 as a revolutionary act, a true turning point in the history of the Continent ‘to banish 
once and for all the demons of the past’.43 This is, of course, not a new narrative. In an attempt 
to foster a common identity amongst the member states of the European Economic Community, 
the European Council in 1985 not only adopted the European flag but also designated 9 May 
as ‘Europe Day’. It thus officially affirmed the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950 – in which 
the French foreign minister had proposed a supranational economic organisation to eliminate 
‘the age-old opposition of France and Germany’ – as the founding act of the European 
integration process.44 The Preamble of the Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe, 
signed in Rome in October 2004 but later replaced by the Lisbon Treaty, similarly referred to 
the ‘bitter experiences’ and ‘former divisions’ that needed to be overcome by mutual respect 
and cooperation ‘to forge a common destiny’ and ‘to continue along the path of civilisation, 
progress and prosperity, for the good of all its inhabitants’.45 In this light, European integration 
appears as the only viable alternative to European self-destruction and decline, as a historic 
necessity and moral obligation to learn from the mistakes of the past.46  
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The fact that this development was only a partial one, limited to certain areas of Western 
Europe, was brought to the fore in connection with the end of the Cold War and the 
transformation processes in Central and Eastern Europe. The possibility (and necessity) of 
Eastern enlargement was quickly raised by European officials and politicians. Following its 
summit in Dublin in June 1990, the European Council ‘expressed its deep satisfaction’ at the 
reforms in the former Soviet bloc and its hope ‘of overcoming the divisions of Europe and 
restoring the unity of the continent whose peoples share a common heritage and culture’.47 The 
aforementioned Laeken Declaration of 2001 welcomed the accession of ten new member states 
enthusiastically, arguing even that the European Union was thereby ‘finally closing one of the 
darkest chapters in European history: the Second World War and the ensuing artificial division 
of Europe’. ‘The unification of Europe is near’, it stated, making a case for further, fundamental 
reforms: ‘At long last, Europe is on its way of becoming one big family, without bloodshed, a 
real transformation clearly calling for a different approach from fifty years ago, when six 
countries first took the lead.’48 Such interpretations and statements not only imply a natural 
unity of Europe and primordial membership of its community, but they also propose a 
Whiggish notion of continuous progress towards ever more integration, peace, and prosperity 
on the Continent, implicitly associating Eurosceptic voices with regressive views and a 
potential return to those dark moments of nationalism and war. Marginalising conflicts and 
differences of opinion, such as the French rejection of UK membership in the 1960s, and very 
much keeping an inward-looking stance (ignoring, for instance, the turmoil and suffering 
created by decolonisation), the history of the EU is presented as an uninterrupted story of 
success: ‘We must never forget that: From war, we have created peace. From hatred, we have 
created respect. From division, we have created union. From dictatorship and oppression, we 
have created vibrant and sturdy democracies. From poverty, we have created prosperity.’49 
The narrative of peace and reconciliation, of integration and institutionalisation, clearly 
differentiating the European project from previous moments of strife and violence, has always 
been complemented by a more positive look into Europe’s past, the search for commonalities 
and predecessors to establish a sense of tradition and moral obligation towards previous 
generations.50 Politicians typically refer to Europe’s Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian 
heritage, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment – tendencies and developments that did of 
course not reach all corners of the Continent and exclude as much as they include. This also 
applies to the famous Charlemagne Prize, which goes back to a local initiative of the city of 
Aachen (1949) in honour of the ‘great founder of western culture’ and was meant to celebrate 
‘commendable individuals who have encouraged political, economic and intellectual ideas on 
western unity’.51 A new, more inclusive declaration was passed in 1990 and the prize has since 
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been awarded to five East-Central European personalities (starting with Gyula Horn in 1990), 
but the website still celebrates Charlemagne as the ‘father of Europe’ and thus links the 
Franconian king directly to the European integration process since 1949.52 Such efforts 
certainly underline the intricacies of any attempt to forge a common European historical 
consciousness, which is why official EU statements speak in more general terms of our 
‘common heritage and culture’ (Dublin Declaration) or ‘the cultural, religious and humanist 
inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and 
inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule of law’.53 
However, such rhetoric not only neglects the fact that Europe was equally the birthplace of 
nationalism, racism, and imperialism, it also makes it difficult to delineate a uniquely European 
set of values that would differentiate the community from the rest of the western (and 
increasingly wider) world.  
In early 2014, the European Union launched the so-called ‘New Narrative for Europe’ 
project with the declared aim ‘to contribute to bringing Europe closer to its citizens and 
reviving a “European” spirit via the arts and sciences’. It was a forward-looking rather than 
retrospective initiative, hoping to restore ‘the waning confidence in Europe’ given the new 
realities and challenges facing the Continent.54 In its first stage, it was aimed at artists, 
intellectuals, and scientists, while the second phase (starting in February 2016) was less elite-
driven and involved youth organisations. In his introduction to ‘The Mind and Body of 
Europe’, a collection of essays including texts by György Konrád, Jürgen Habermas, and 
Michelangelo Pistoletto, the then President of the European Commission expressed his hope 
that the project would strengthen the European public space of debate and sense of 
togetherness. Once again, he presented the master narrative of peace and reconciliation: ‘That 
is the founding narrative of the European Union: to make war impossible among us by coming 
together through economic integration.’ ‘The ideas of peace, democracy and respect for human 
dignity’, he continued, ‘remain as compelling as ever for European integration, the most 
visionary political project in recent history. No other political construction to date has proven 
to be a better way of organising life so as to lessen the barbarity in this world, and overcome 
war, dictatorship and extreme nationalism.’55 The original declaration of various prominent 
cultural figures provided a slightly more balanced interpretation of Europe’s past, highlighting 
the various achievements but also emphasising that ‘Europe should never forget that its 
prosperity in modern times is often tied to colonial conquest and was, therefore, attained at the 
cost of those from other continents.’56 This attempt to get away from a single unifying master 
narrative and to pay attention to both the accomplishments and tragedies of history, to draw 
lessons from the past without dismissing alternative narratives and options, and to acknowledge 
that ‘European history is something other than “national” history’, and that ‘it is also something 
other than the addition of “national histories”, seems to be reflected in the New House of 
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European History that was opened in Brussels in May 2017 on the initiative of the European 
Parliament.57 However, the museum has not gone uncontested. It has been described as 
promoting ‘an ideologically biased, chaotic narrative line with many shortcomings or even 
falsifications’, marginalising, for instance, the roots of European heritage and unity before the 
French Revolution, including Christianity, or failing to pay sufficient attention to the 
perspectives and experiences of medium-sized and smaller countries.58  
Recent scholars of European history similarly refrain from presenting an overarching 
narrative or theme. This is partly a consequence of the linguistic turn and postmodern paradigm 
according to which ‘there is no longer the possibility of a grand narrative that gives history 
coherence and meaning’.59 But in contrast to the historiography of the early and mid-twentieth 
century by the likes of Hay, de Rougemont, and Lipgens, who often identified with and aimed 
to contributed to European economic and political integration, they have also come to 
appreciate the fluid geographical, cultural, and political boundaries of the notion of Europe as 
well as the complexity and diversity of European historical experiences.60 In his magisterial 
book on the history of the twentieth century, Mark Mazower, for instance, described Europe as 
a ‘dark continent’ and argued that the ‘Europe’ of the European Union ‘may be a promise or a 
delusion, but it is not a reality.’ ‘Taking the divisions and uncertainties of this continent 
seriously’, he maintained further, ‘implies abandoning metaphysics, renouncing the search for 
some mysterious and essential “Europe”, and exploring instead the constant contest to define 
what it should mean.’61 Tony Judt, on the other hand, in a book that was shortlisted for the 
Pulitzer Prize, openly embraced the achievements of European unity and emphasised the moral 
and political lessons of the past: ‘Europe’s barbarous recent history, the dark “other” against 
which post-war Europe was laboriously constructed, is already beyond recall for young 
Europeans. Within a generation the memorials and museums will be gathering dust – visited, 
like the battlefields of the Western front today, only by aficionados and relatives.’ If Europe’s 
past was ‘to continue to furnish Europe’s present with admonitory meaning and moral 
purpose’, he concluded by echoing Croce, it would have ‘to be taught afresh with each passing 
generation’: ‘“European Union” may be a response to history, but it can never be a substitute.’62  
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